lotfollah nabavi; mojtaba amir khanlu; mohammad ali hojati
Abstract
First, we shall scrutinize Modal Generalism and Modal Particularism, two main metaphysical approaches to modality, and recount their differences. Second, we’ll explain epistemic and metaphysical possibilities and how they are explicated at generalism. There, we’ll show that metaphysical necessity, ...
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First, we shall scrutinize Modal Generalism and Modal Particularism, two main metaphysical approaches to modality, and recount their differences. Second, we’ll explain epistemic and metaphysical possibilities and how they are explicated at generalism. There, we’ll show that metaphysical necessity, nemed to broad logical necessity, is a kind of logical necessity. By this definition of metaphysical necessity, the relation between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility is partial-general-and-specific. Third, on the one hand we’ll critique the modal generalism in which our intuitive perception of modality will be refuted and on the other hand, some accounts of modal particularism like Possibilism and Haecceitism are confronted with some kind of Ungroundedness. Next, we’ll present a new account of modal particularism. In this new account, the concept of “being a possible world”, as a modal concept, is counted as Primitive concept. With the help of this new account and the concept Conceiving, we’ll present a new definition of Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility. At last, we shall show that in this new definition, the relation between epistemic and metaphysical possibility is absolute-general-and-specific.
lotfollah nabavi; mojtaba amir khanluo
Abstract
Actualism is an ontological thesis according to which the domain of existent objects and the domain of actual ones are the same. According to this thesis, we do not need to commit to any non-actual objects for solving any philosophical problems. The approach of Bernard Linsky, Edward N. Zalta and Michael ...
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Actualism is an ontological thesis according to which the domain of existent objects and the domain of actual ones are the same. According to this thesis, we do not need to commit to any non-actual objects for solving any philosophical problems. The approach of Bernard Linsky, Edward N. Zalta and Michael Nelson is one of the current approaches to the actualism which is known as “New Actualism”. They offer a new presupposition about existent objects according to which a concrete object is in fact contingently concrete object and a non-concrete object, if not be (unlike the number 11) an abstract one is (like the Masaya’s child) contingently non-concrete object. So, by supposing contingently non-concrete objects, they can present a model with fixed domain and not-world-restricted quantifiers which can validate formulas like Barcan Formula, Conversion of Barcan Formula, Necessary Existence and Iterated Modality and offer a suitable explanation for intuitions which support the formula of Possibility of Aliens. However, some critics like Karen Bennett believe that in this approach, some non-actual entities have enumerated as actual objects and consequently New Actualism is a kind of Proxy Actualism. In this article, by adopting an opponent position to Karen Bennett’s one, we try to describe New Actualism and some criticisms about it and to show that New Actualism is not a kind of Proxy Actualism.
